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INTRODUCTION
It’s no secret that antitrust law is having its moment in the sun—and
technology is the target. In recent years, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed
breaking up the “Big Tech”1 companies as part of her presidential campaign
platform,2 and former Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim spoke
passionately about addressing competition issues in the technology industry
in his parting speech.3 Constituents and politicians on both sides of the aisle
are in favor of breaking up Big Tech companies, making this an issue with
bipartisan support.4
However, opinions by experts on whether the breakup of Big Tech is a
valuable and viable solution are far-ranging. Despite strong advocacy by some
that breaking up Big Tech companies is the best solution to the competition
issues present in the technology sector, these proposals are often stated in
basic terms with little speciﬁcity.5 Likewise, opposition to breaking up Big
Tech often cites administrability by the courts as a key obstacle but does not
provide speciﬁcity as to why this undertaking is out of the court’s abilities.6
In this Comment, I will explore in detail whether a breakup of the “Big
Tech” companies is feasible given the unique nature of the technology
business. Characteristics that are central to today’s technology companies,
such as zero-price business models and advantageous network eﬀects, were
not present during the last breakup in United States antitrust history with
1 “Big Tech” is used in this Comment to refer collectively to the four major technology
companies referenced herein: Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon.
2 Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
[https://perma.cc/4J2U-S33Z].
3 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., “A Whole New
World”: An Antitrust Entreaty for a Digital Age (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-ﬁnal-address [https://perma.cc/2L6R-PFYL]
(“The events of recent days have laid bare the extraordinary inﬂuence of tech giants in matters of
public policy. But if we don’t ﬁnd a way to harness that market power into partnership with
democratic policy-making, we risk devastating outcomes for our civil democratic society.”).
4 Rani Molla, Poll: Most Americans Want to Break Up Big Tech, VOX (Jan. 26, 2021, 2:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2021/1/26/22241053/antitrust-google-facebook-break-up-big-tech-monopoly
[https://perma.cc/XZ7A-HFV8] (“Some 59 percent of people surveyed in the online poll said they
supported breaking up big tech monopolies, including 24 percent who said they strongly support it.”).
5 See Warren, supra note 2 (stating which companies should be broken up but giving little detail
on how assets should be divided).
6 See Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases
4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regul. Stud., Working Paper No. 01-05, 2001) (describing how the
courts could be slow to anticipate changes in technology and the industry); see also Rory Van Loo,
In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1955, 1965 (2020)
(“Much of the intellectual foundation of the opposition to breakups comes from the Chicago School.
These scholars have theorized that it is quite diﬃcult to know what makes a ﬁrm appeal to
consumers. . . . Since courts and regulators are unlikely to be able to ﬁgure such questions out, a
governmental breakup would risk ruining what consumers value most about the company.”).

2022]

Breaking Up Big Tech

525

the divestment of Bell from AT&T. These novel factors should thus be taken
into account when evaluating any proposal to break up Big Tech.
This Comment also uses speciﬁc examples from the business models of
each of the four Big Tech companies to determine how a division of resources
in a breakup could hypothetically aﬀect those operations. Based on those
scenarios, I will draw inferences on whether a structural remedy like a
breakup or spinoﬀ is advisable and whether the resulting companies would be
able to function properly in the market after the divestiture. Since there has
been so much recent endorsement for utilizing structural remedies in the
current Big Tech federal antitrust lawsuits, advocates should appropriately
analyze the mechanics of breakups and spinoﬀs and the potential eﬀects they
could have on companies and consumers alike.
Part I discusses the application of structural remedies in United States
antitrust history as well as the abundance of support for these remedies when
discussing market competition issues in the technology sector. Following that
background, Part II delves into the speciﬁc factors involved in a breakup. It
discusses the diﬀerent challenges in dividing up physical and intangible assets
as well as the post-divestiture monitoring and oversight that will be required.
It also evaluates whether breakups are the most eﬀective solution to the
antitrust violations alleged in the technology industry and discusses
alternative remedies that could be used instead.
I. THE HISTORY OF BREAKUPS: PRESENT AND PAST
In the United States, the purpose of antitrust law is to preserve
competitive markets and produce a high output of goods in a sustainable
market.7 Promoting economic welfare is the main focus rather than solving
social or political issues.8 Two types of remedies can be applied by courts in
response to antitrust violations: behavioral, which try to limit ﬁrms from
engaging in speciﬁc anticompetitive behaviors, and structural, which
essentially dismantle companies so that the anticompetitive behavior is no
longer possible or beneﬁcial.9 Structural remedies have been sparingly used
in the United States, but recently have become a popular solution to suggest
in response to Big Tech’s dominance of the technology sector.10
7 Herbert Hovenkamp, Opinion, Antitrust Remedies for Big Tech, REGUL. REV. (Jan. 18, 2021),
https://www.theregreview.org/2021/01/18/hovenkamp-antitrust-remedies-big-tech
[https://perma.cc/FZ9X-JG4L].
8 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013).
9 See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 980
(2019) (contrasting the use of behavioral and structural remedies in antitrust).
10 See, e.g., id. at 973-74 (advocating for the use of structural separations, prohibitions, and
remedies); Warren, supra note 2 (calling for structural remedies in the context of antitrust).
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A. The Call to Break Up Big Tech
Over the last few decades, tech companies have become prominent players
in the economy. Since 1995, when the companies at the top of the Fortune
500 list like Exxon Mobil, General Electric, and Coca-Cola represented
manufacturing and consumer products industries, there has been a huge shift
towards the technology sector.11 In 2020, the top ﬁve companies were all tech
industry giants and Google, the fourth highest company, almost doubled the
market capitalization of the ﬁrst non-technology company, Berkshire
Hathaway, which placed sixth on the list.12 These companies rose to power
through innovative means, but critics argue that the methods they use to
retain their dominant market positions often violate antitrust regulations.13
Each of the major tech companies, Alphabet (Google), Amazon,
Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple are often accused of using anticompetitive
business methods and wielding their dominant market position to stiﬂe
competitors. In 1998, Microsoft was involved in a notable antitrust lawsuit
which resulted in the court ordering a breakup of the company.14 However,
Microsoft settled with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and agreed to share
its technology with other companies, so the DOJ abandoned the breakup
requirement.15 Currently, two of these four Big Tech giants, Google and
Facebook, are currently facing federal antitrust lawsuits in the United States.16
The remaining two, Amazon and Apple, are facing investigations by the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and DOJ along with several state Attorney
Generals and are also facing scrutiny abroad from the European Union’s

11 See Gary Hoover, Most Valuable Companies: The Last 25 Years, AM. BUS. HIST. CTR. (Aug.
20, 2020), https://americanbusinesshistory.org/most-valuable-companies-the-last-25-years [https://
perma.cc/VY6L-L83U] (depicting a video graph showing the change in the most valuable Fortune
500 companies from 1995 to 2020).
12 Id. (listing the top ﬁve companies, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook, in
that order).
13 See Tim Wu, Opinion, Facebook Cannot Buy Its Way Out of Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/opinion/facebook-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/74WHSLWG] (“No one faults Facebook for gaining its social networking dominance in the ﬁrst place,
beating rivals like Myspace in the 2000s. The trouble is what it did to hold on to the kingdom.”).
14 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
15 Revised Proposed Final Judgment at 2-3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2001) (“Microsoft shall disclose to ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and OEMs, for the sole
purpose of interoperating with a Windows Operating System Product, via the Microsoft Developer
Network (‘MSDN’) or similar mechanisms, the APIs and related Documentation that are used by
Microsoft Middleware to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Product.”).
16 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization (Dec. 9,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization
[https://perma.cc/MU7H-N95Z]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues
Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/2LBG-RJV9].
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antitrust regulators.17 Below is a description of commonly cited antitrust
concerns relating to each of the Big Tech companies as well as examples of
proposals to break them up. This is simply an overview; a further exploration on
whether these proposals are feasible or favorable given the unique nature of the
technology industry will be addressed in Part II of this Comment.
1. Facebook
In the case of Facebook, one of the most common concerns is the use of
killer acquisitions—an aggressive acquisition strategy where the dominant
company buys up small competitors in the market before they have a chance
to evolve into larger threats.18 Suitably, the policy solution to this has often
been to undo these mergers, such as Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and
WhatsApp, platforms predicted to be a substantial competitive threat if they
were spun-oﬀ from the company.19 Furthermore, this kind of structural
remedy would be easy to ﬁnd legal reasoning for, since the federal
government “explicitly reserved the right to take another look at the mergers”
when they approved them in the ﬁrst place.20
In the FTC’s current lawsuit against Facebook, the Commission argues
for the “divestiture or reconstruction of businesses” and speciﬁcally names
Instagram and WhatsApp as targets to restore competition in the social media
platform industry.21 The industry itself has a high barrier to entry; social
networks can retain their market power in part because of strong network
effects—the fact that more users are using a given platform is what makes it
appealing to consumers, which also makes it difficult for new entrants to
compete.22 This is why when a competitive threat emerges, acquiring the

17 Leah Nylen, Apple’s Easy Ride from U.S. Authorities May Be Over, POLITICO (June 24, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/24/justice-department-anti-trust-apple-337120
[https://perma.cc/5FN4-89F2]; Tyler Sonnemaker, Amazon Is Reportedly Facing a New Antitrust
Investigation into Its Online Marketplace Led by the FTC and Attorney General in New York and California,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2020, 3:53 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-antitrust-probe-ftcnew-york-california-online-marketplace-2020-8 [https://perma.cc/E3EC-UNJV]; Adam Satariano,
Amazon Charged with Antitrust Violations by European Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/business/amazon-eu-antitrust.html?auth=login-google
[https://perma.cc/J6CJ-HCXM].
18 See Wu, supra note 13 (“During the 2010s, the idea that they could ‘always just buy any
competitive start-ups’ (Mr. Zuckerberg’s words) became the default strategy for dealing with new
threats.”); Warren, supra note 2 (discussing how Facebook’s purchase of potential competitors
Instagram and WhatsApp exempliﬁed the use of a merger to limit competition).
19 See Van Loo, supra note 6, at 1964 (“Instagram—if Facebook was forced to divest it—would
reportedly fetch a price over a hundred billion dollars.”).
20 Wu, supra note 13.
21 Complaint at 51, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-03590 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021).
22 Id. at 3.
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competitor is often easier than trying to compete.23 This is the core of
Facebook’s alleged antitrust violations and the main focus of proposals to break
up the company.24 However, since WhatsApp and Instagram remain viable as
independent companies, spinning off these assets will be a much easier task
than it would be to break up internally developed assets.25
2. Google
The focus on Google’s violations is around using its search function to
limit competition and promote its own services. Senator Warren’s proposal
to break up Google states that “Google allegedly snuﬀed out a competing
small search engine by demoting its content on its search algorithm, and it
has favored its own restaurant ratings over those of Yelp.”26
In addition, Google also faces similar criticism to Facebook regarding
killer acquisitions, with Waze, Nest, and DoubleClick being commonly cited
as mergers that should be spun-oﬀ into separate companies.27 Additionally,
many proponents of a Google breakup call for a spinoﬀ of YouTube, Chrome,
Android, Google Search, and Google’s advertising capabilities, claiming that
its dominant position in the search market is “unfairly supported through its
advertising business and software oﬀering such as Chrome and the Android
mobile operating system.”28 Critics of Google’s practices state that bundling
its advertising tools makes it diﬃcult for rivals to compete on cost, and that
owning both the search function as well as the end-use application websites
that users are trying to reach—such as YouTube and Gmail—also stiﬂes
competition.29 Additionally, the power that Google Search has as a
“horizontal” (or general) search engine to promote its own “vertical” (or
speciﬁc category) search functions over third-party vertical search products
like Yelp and TripAdvisor makes these third-parties heavily disadvantaged

23 See id. at 2 (“[Facebook] CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s view, expressed in a 2008 email . . . ‘it is
better to buy than compete.’”) (emphasis added).
24 See Warren, supra note 2 (describing how Facebook purchased its potential competitors,
Instagram and WhatsApp, in an attempt to limit its competition).
25 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
26 Warren, supra note 2.
27 See id. (claiming that the unwinding of these killer acquisitions would prevent Google from
demoting their competitors’ products on Google Search).
28 Mike Moore, Google Chrome Could Be Sold Off in US Government Break-up Plans, TECHRADAR
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.techradar.com/news/google-may-have-to-sell-off-chrome-in-break-upplans [https://perma.cc/LJ69-DQVN].
29 Lauren Hirsch & Megan Graham, States Are Leaning Toward a Push to Break Up Google’s Ad
Tech Business, CNBC (June 5, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/states-leantoward-pushing-to-break-up-googles-ad-tech-business.html [https://perma.cc/S8R5-DVLA].
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even if they were the preferred search method by consumers in the vertical
category.30
An issue unique to digital platforms when considering antitrust remedies
is that many of these technology companies operate using a business model
wherein they do not charge users anything to use their service and then
supplement operations costs and garner proﬁt through advertisement
revenue.31 This business model makes it diﬃcult to determine whether an
antitrust violation has taken place32 but, more relevant to this Comment, will
also make it diﬃcult to break apart the companies in a way that allows this
business model to continue in its current state. The revenue that comes from
the advertising side of the market depends on the presence of consumers and
their data which allows the platform to provide its product to the consumers
without charging them a fee.33 If a breakup remedy suggests splitting oﬀ these
two sides of the market into separate entities, it will be diﬃcult for the
product to remain proﬁtable without beginning to charge consumers a fee.
3. Apple
The primary violations alleged against Apple are more closely related to
the complaints against Google than the complaints against Facebook. Rather
than focusing on prior acquisitions, critics against Apple state that its
exclusive control of its iOS and Apple App Store require third-party apps to
unfairly compete with Apple’s apps.34 For example, Apple has been accused

30 See Khan, supra note 9, at 998-99 (describing how Google’s control of the horizontal search
allowed it to display its “Universal Search” results at or near the top of the ranking page and provide
“eye-catching interfaces” to attract users to Google vertical properties, which disadvantaged its vertical
rivals by demoting their results and failing to provide them with a similar embellishing interface).
31 If Google is Free, How Does it Make So Much Money?, CHANNEL 4 (Nov. 27, 2012),
https://www.channel4.com/news/if-google-is-free-how-does-it-make-so-much-money
[https://perma.cc/6XZB-S8VZ].
32 John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 16263 (2015) (discussing how it is diﬃcult to apply above marginal cost pricing analysis to zero-price
products such as platforms).
33 See If Google is Free, How Does it Make So Much Money?, supra note 31 (describing the central
role of user data to the operation of platforms).
34 See Khan supra note 9, at 1006-07 (discussing how Apple uses its vertically integrated model
to privilege its own apps by charging competing apps a fee on in-app purchases, preventing
competitors from communicating directly with Apple-based users, and rejecting the app
enhancements and bug ﬁxes of competing apps in Apple’s app marketplace); Nilay Patel, Elizabeth
Warren Wants to Break Up Apple, Too, VERGE (Mar. 9, 2019, 6:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust [https://perma.cc/X2H2SZFE] (explaining how Apple apps have a comparative advantage over third-party apps sold on the
Apple App Store due to Apple’s ability to obtain buyer and seller information from these thirdparty developers before placing its own apps in the store).
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“by rival Spotify that it unfairly pushed its own music streaming service,”
which led to European Union antitrust scrutiny.35
Unlike the other Big Tech companies, Apple is infrequently the target of
calls to break up the company, and critics are more eager to allow third parties
to host their own App Stores than to siphon oﬀ Apple’s App Store into a
separate company.36 Instead, the antitrust remedy frequently requested for
this problem is a mandatory injunction forcing Apple to host third-party app
stores, rather than a structural remedy.37 This is likely due to the fact that
hosting an App Store and hosting apps for its own hardware are
straightforward business practices that go hand in hand rather than separate
businesses hosted under the same parent company, as with Instagram and
Facebook. However, Apple is beginning to delve into other industries as well
and use its dominance in its current industry to bolster these new business
ventures, which may mean that more demands for a breakup will emerge in
the near future.38
4. Amazon
Amazon faces antitrust criticism for both hosting the marketplace on its
platform while also operating as merchant in that platform. Combined, these
features disadvantage third-party merchants due to Amazon favoring its own
products over rivals’ and, in some cases, delisting certain third-party
merchants so that only Amazon has exclusive ability to sell certain products.39
In addition, third-party merchants on Amazon have stated concerns about
“suspend[ed] or shut down accounts” and “with[held] merchant funds,
change[d] page displays, and throttle[d] or block[ed] favorable reviews.”40
Another concern about Amazon’s marketplace practice is its widespread
collection of merchant data, which it then uses to shape its own retail
35 Foo Yun Chee, Exclusive: Apple Faces EU Charges Over Spotify Complaint - Sources, REUTERS (Mar.
4, 2021, 11:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-antitrust-exclusive/exclusive-apple-faceseu-charges-over-spotify-complaint-sources-idUSKBN2AW24K [https://perma.cc/2PLV-E6UA].
36 See Russel Brandom, Three Questions That Will Decide Epic v. Apple, VERGE (Apr. 8, 2021, 1:00
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/8/22373826/epic-games-v-apple-fortnite-app-store-antitrustlawsuit [https://perma.cc/C2XW-TTC8] (discussing the lawsuit between Epic and Apple over
complaints about the App Store business model).
37 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019) (alleging that Apple’s iOS App
Store is an example of attempted monopolization in the market for iPhone apps); Epic Games, Inc.
v. Apple Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 817, 827 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (arguing against Apple’s right to exclusive
distribution of applications through the iOS App Store).
38 Cale Guthrie Weissman, It’s Time to Break Up Apple, FAST CO. (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90325145/its-time-to-break-up-apple [https://perma.cc/2PZ2-LWMJ]
(describing Apple’s new revenue sources and antitrust concerns raised by them).
39 See Khan, supra note 9, at 988-89 (discussing the Marketplace policies implemented by
Amazon that detrimentally impact third-party rival sellers).
40 Id. at 992.
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strategy.41 This allows it to aggregate data on a scale that is “unrivaled” by any
other retail seller and use this data as the core marketing strategy when selling
its own goods, such as Amazon Basics products.42 While many may agree that
this practice is deserving of antitrust scrutiny and regulation, the sharing of
data between Amazon’s marketplace and private-label retail goods may pose
an issue when structuring a breakup of the two.
Finally, another frequent topic is the potential spinoﬀ of Amazon Web
Services (AWS), Amazon’s cloud computing business, from its consumerfacing retail marketplace business. Many cite AWS as the main source of
Amazon’s value.43 AWS is also thought to be subsidizing Amazon’s retail
business and the proﬁt from AWS allows Amazon to pursue projects such as
Alexa and Kindle without fear of ﬁnancial failure.44 In this way, the business
models of AWS and other Amazon businesses are closely connected in the
same way that Amazon marketplace is connected to Amazon Basics—another
consideration when structuring a divestment.
Although the idea of divesting two parts of a company with diﬀerent
business models or simply unwinding a merger sounds simple in theory, the
policy proposals to break up the Big Tech companies raise many questions
about the speciﬁcs of the breakup. It is vital to consider what the details of
such breakups would look like, and how regulators intend to implement such
breakups in practice. For example, while spinning oﬀ prior mergers may seem
simple, there may be unforeseen challenges now that the companies have been
integrated for years and borrowed from each other’s intellectual property.45
There is little historical precedent to act as a guideline for breaking up a
company and no precedent for breaking up a modern-day technology giant,
so regulators will have a host of novel issues to grapple with from a business
organization standpoint.
B. A History of Structural Remedies in Antitrust Law
Despite the infrequent usage of breakups in antitrust lawsuits, a 2004
antitrust guide written by the Justice Department stated that structural
remedies are preferable “because they are relatively clean and certain, and
generally avoid costly government entanglement in the market” while
41 See id. (“In addition to implementing Marketplace policies that favor Amazon’s direct sales,
Amazon appropriates Marketplace merchants’ data to shape its own retail strategy.”).
42 See id. at 992-93 (“Reports suggest Amazon uses this trove of Marketplace data to inform
both its retail business and its private labels.”).
43 Fergus McKeown, Should Amazon Spin-oﬀ AWS?, MEDIUM (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://medium.com/swlh/should-amazon-spin-off-aws-e15d6e307506 [https://perma.cc/7MAC-TNR5]
(using data to illustrate the value of AWS to Amazon).
44 Id.
45 See infra Section II.A.2.
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behavioral remedies are “typically . . . more diﬃcult to craft, more
cumbersome and costly to administer, and easier than a structural remedy to
circumvent.”46 However, this guide is almost two decades old and predates a
lot of the competitive issues related speciﬁcally to the technology industry.
Further, the guide itself states that “The Remedy Should Promote
Competition, Not Competitors.”47
Before delving into the novel issues that breaking up a technology
company may entail, it would be beneﬁcial to ﬁrst review the most wellknown structural remedies that have previously been applied in the United
States and how they aﬀected competition. Although these remedies are rare,
they can provide some insight when evaluating whether they would be an
eﬀective remedy in the present situation.
The first well-known monopoly breakup in the United States was in 1911
when Standard Oil was broken up into 34 companies.48 Many believe that the
Standard Oil breakup was unsuccessful.49 Since the breakup reallocated stock
amongst the same associates of the original parent company, it did little to alter
the wealth of the monopolists.50 It is difficult to quantify the competitive effects
of the Standard Oil dissolution on the industry, because the breakup happened
at the same time the market was becoming more competitive generally.51
However, some analysis done on the oil market after the breakup showed a
decrease in output and increase in gasoline prices, so there is little evidence that
the breakup itself had any positive effects on market competition.52
The AT&T breakup in 1984 represents another major structural remedy
in Unites States history. The DOJ utilized this breakup to separate AT&T’s
long-distance phone service from its regional phone service, which was
divided up into a group of carriers called the Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs).53 Faced with antitrust violations and the prospect of a breakup,
AT&T voluntarily submitted a proposed plan of reorganization as a Consent

46 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES 7-8 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175136/download [https://perma.cc/4Z4W4AF7] (discussing why structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases).
47 Id. at 5.
48 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177, 198-99 (E.D. Mo. 1909).
49 See, e.g., Noah Joshua Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, We Need to Talk: Toward a
Serious Conversation About Breakups 8-9 (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/
documents/public_statements/1517972/phillis_-_we_need_to_talk_0519.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP8D3S7M] (suggesting there is a lack of compelling evidence that the Standard Oil breakup increased
competition or beneﬁtted consumers).
50 Id.
51 See Crandall, supra note 6, at 26 (explaining that the oil industry was becoming more
competitive due to the success of new entrants).
52 Id. at 22.
53 See Phillips, supra note 49, at 10 (recounting the history of the AT&T breakup).
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Decree to settle the lawsuit.54 The proposed Consent Decree, which was later
approved by the court, is nearly 500 pages long and details virtually every
aspect of the breakup. Looking in depth at this breakup in particular is helpful
when drafting a Big Tech breakup proposal, since it is widely considered to
be a “successful divestiture.”55 “Judge Posner called the breakup of AT&T
‘arguably the most successful structural remedy in U.S. antitrust history’” and
there is compelling evidence to suggest that competition in the
telecommunications industry increased after the breakup.56
Although these case studies provide only a few notable instances, they
illustrate how structural remedies have been applied in practice, which may
provide guidelines for how to structure a proposal to break up Big Tech.
II. BREAKING DOWN A BUSINESS
Before diving into the speciﬁcs of a divestiture or spinoﬀ—which assets
will be assigned to which company, how proprietary information will be dealt
with, how trade secrets can be protected, etc.—it is important to consider
some general issues that may arise. As mentioned, the policy proposals to
break up Big Tech companies are typically high-level overviews and often
lack speciﬁcity as to how the resulting companies will function. However,
there has been some discussion on how Big Tech companies might divest or
spin oﬀ a company.
For example, scholar Rory Van Loo has suggested that a breakup
enforcement should include “not only leveraging the monopoly’s resources,
but also involving independent third-party M&A consultants” in a way that
promotes “collaborative governance” rather than an “adversarial law
enforcement procedure,” suggesting that this will be effective because
voluntary spinoffs are often undertaken as part of their business strategy.57 Van
Loo is right that spinoffs are part of the ordinary course of business, and
therefore companies would know how to structure a spinoff if ordered by the
court.58 However, there are some notable issues with this proposal. First,
54 Plan of Reorganization, United States v. W. Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 225 (D.D.C. Aug.
11, 1982) (No. 82-0192), https://www.beatriceco.com/bti/porticus/bell/pdf/82-0192.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2TDC-NHT2] [hereinafter Consent Decree].
55 See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Could the Old AT&T Break-Up Offer Lessons for Big Tech Today?, NPR
(June 26, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/26/736344175/could-the-old-at-t-break-upoffer-lessons-for-big-tech-today [https://perma.cc/8WJQ-RFB6] (stating that the AT&T breakup
was successful).
56 See Phillips, supra note 49, at 11.
57 See Van Loo, supra note 6, at 1960.
58 See, e.g., Andrew J. Hawkins, Google Is Spinning Oﬀ Its Self-Driving Car Program into a New
Company Called Waymo, VERGE (Dec. 13, 2016, 12:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/12/13/
13936782/google-self-driving-car-waymo-spin-off-company [https://perma.cc/S2AS-CNA9] (“Google
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voluntary spinoffs are conducted in order to increase the competitive advantage
of each standalone company, not to curtail their market power, and parent
companies are free to re-acquire the spinoff if it is strategically beneficial.59
Second, putting the responsibility of structuring spinoffs in the hands of
company executives and trusting them to do so in a way that is beneficial to the
market competition and not their individual firm puts a lot of faith in the same
businesses that committed the antitrust violations in the first place. This has
the potential to lead to self-dealing issues and a breakup that is not as effective
as it should be. Even with bringing in third-party M&A specialists, the risk of
an ineffective breakup remains high. Specialists are trained to prioritize
business strategy, not antitrust, and if the firm breakup does not do enough to
improve market competition, it was probably not the best remedy to use.
Another example to consider when conceptualizing a Big Tech breakup is
to look at previous structural remedies used in the United States.60 The
AT&T breakup in 1984 would be the most helpful when orchestrating a tech
platform breakup, since telecommunications is more analogous to technology
than oil production. However, it is important to remember the vast
diﬀerences between AT&T’s business model as a telecommunications
company and the business model of modern technology corporations.
Although the Consent Decree voluntarily submitted to the court by AT&T
is detailed and thorough, there are inevitably many aspects of the proposal
that would not apply to a Big Tech breakup as well as many issues central to
a Big Tech breakup that AT&T did not need to consider. Identifying where
the AT&T proposal falls short will mark brand-new, uncharted territory for
Big Tech, leaving companies to form a solution themselves without any
precedent. Of course, this is not an impossible feat; after all, AT&T created
many of these solutions from scratch. However, it will require an increased
level of scrutiny from any court overseeing the breakup to avoid the selfdealing problems described earlier. The following Section presents a detailed
investigation of the potential mechanics for a Big Tech breakup, using the
AT&T Consent Decree as a starting guideline.

announced that it would be spinning oﬀ its six-year-old self-driving project into a standalone
business called Waymo.”).
59 See, e.g., Deni Connor & Jennifer Mears, Novell Might Reabsorb Caching Spinoﬀ, NETWORK
WORLD (Oct. 28, 2002, 12:00 AM), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2342962/novell-mightreabsorb-caching-spinoff.html [https://perma.cc/B56A-PXT7] (recounting how parent company Novell is
reportedly close to re-acquiring its caching spinoff because the spinoff did not meet growth expectations).
60 See supra, Section I.B (providing a history of structural antitrust remedies in the United States).
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A. Corporate Breakups in Practice
When looking at the actual mechanics of the breakup, we must consider
how diﬀerent assets will be divided between the separating companies.
Diﬀerent resources will have varying levels of importance in the business
structure and therefore should be dealt with diﬀerently.
1. Dividing Up Physical Assets
The simplest part of structuring a Big Tech breakup would be dividing up
the physical assets. Throughout the limited history of antitrust breakups in
the United States, most of the companies involved were in the manufacturing
industry, and their business models revolved around the sale of physical
goods.61 Although some Big Tech platform companies such as Facebook and
Google reside mostly online, Amazon and Apple have large manufacturing
components to their businesses. The calls to break up tech companies often
involve plans to separate physical goods from the platform, such as divesting
the Amazon Basics brand and the Amazon marketplace or unlinking Apple’s
manufactured products from their iOS and digital business.62 Therefore,
using a past divestiture such as the AT&T Consent Decree can serve as a
blueprint for navigating the breakup as it relates to physical assets and
manufacturing capabilities.
For example, the AT&T guidelines use a consistent formula for separating
physical resources: simply assign the asset to whichever entity can claim
predominant use and expand on the methodology for determining
predominant use in cases where it is not easily decided.63 As a result, it was
also relatively simple to divide data and personnel resources that were linked
to physical resources and separate AT&T from the BOCs, each of which was
“to be reconﬁgured as [an exchange company] and spun oﬀ from AT&T.”64
An equivalently straightforward method could be used when dividing
physical assets in a Big Tech breakup. However, the ease of dividing physical
resources in a Big Tech breakup is hardly the whole story. Since these
companies are primarily platforms like Facebook, and even products-focused
companies like Apple rely heavily on technology and data, the ability to
61

See supra Section I.B (providing a history of structural antitrust remedies in the United

States).
62 See supra Section I.A (summarizing speciﬁc proposals to breakup Big Tech companies due
to antitrust concerns).
63 See, e.g., Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 42-43 (“Ownership . . . will be determined based
on the projected predominant use of each center as of January 1, 1984. The predominant user of each
center will be identiﬁed by calculating which entity will have the greatest number of data base entries
. . . in that center as of that date.”).
64 Id. at 3.
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divide up intangible assets will be the primary determinant in whether a Big
Tech breakup is feasible.
Another important aspect of the AT&T breakup was that there were
inevitable interactions between the Bell Companies and AT&T after the
divestiture since they were both in the same industry and needed to access
the same telecommunications lines. Similarly, any Big Tech breakup of a
platform from a subsidiary that utilizes that platform, such as an Amazon
Marketplace and Amazon Basics divestiture, would also run into this
interaction issue.65 The AT&T Consent Decree addresses this problem by
posing contracting-for-use as a frequent solution to assets with
multifunctional capabilities.66 A more in-depth consideration of these postdivestiture contracts is conducted in Subection II.A.3.a of this Comment.
2. Dividing Up Intangible Assets
What makes Big Tech diﬀerent from the types of companies that have
been broken down in the past is the intangible nature of the technology
industry and its products. Even AT&T, with a strong technology aspect to
its business model, mostly dealt with physical resources when aiding their
breakup.67 The telecommunications industry during the AT&T breakup era,
although advanced for its time, did not rely on algorithms and massive
amounts of consumer data when running its business, which diﬀers greatly
from a social network such as Facebook or search engine such as Google.68 In
the AT&T Consent Decree, mentions of proprietary data and intellectual
property are scarce compared to discussions about facilities and hardware.69
65 Lauren Cahn, This Is Why AmazonBasics Products Are So Cheap, READER’S DIG. (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.rd.com/article/amazonbasics-products-so-cheap [https://perma.cc/LC8J-RYGM]
(“[T]hey decide which items to include in the AmazonBasics line based on their analysis of actual
customer demand. ‘You can be pretty certain that anything in the AmazonBasics line is a product
Amazon has already deemed essential to its customers.’” (quoting Brittney Mayer)).
66 Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 49 (“InterLATA backbone routes, including mid-links,
will be assigned to AT&T, and the BOCs will be able to contract for capacity on them.”).
67 See supra Subsection II.A.1 (describing the mechanics of the AT&T breakup with respect to
physical assets).
68 Ronald Shamah, 11 Trends Defining Telecommunications, Media and Technology in a
Digital World, PUBLICIS SAPIENT, https://www.publicissapient.com/insights/11-trends-deﬁningtelecommunications-media-and-tech [https://perma.cc/ND54-ME24] (“For the past three decades,
the telecommunications, media and technology (TMT) industries have been at the center of the
revolution in how consumers and businesses react, interact and transact with each other and the
world. The models of society, work and value creation developed post-World War II and prevalent
through the Third Industrial Revolution, are being challenged and replaced by the new models
brought forth by the Fourth Industrial Revolution.”); id. (“Much of the artiﬁcial
intelligence/machine learning conversations to date have focused on the need for access to huge
amounts of data to feed algorithms and neural networks, an area dominated by companies such as
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Facebook . . . .”).
69 See generally Consent Decree, supra note 54.
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As mentioned, aspects like network eﬀects and zero-price models are unique
to Big Tech business strategy.70 Intellectual property and proprietary
algorithms make up the core of these businesses, and thus should be a central
consideration in any developing proposal to break up a technology company.
a. Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets
A successful breakup completed by fully separating a Big Tech giant into
two unrelated companies would ideally treat intangible assets like physical
assets and assign them to one company or the other. Indeed, this process was
used in the AT&T breakup, which stated that “[w]herever practical,
[proprietary] information in the data bases belonging to one party will be
masked or rendered mechanically inaccessible to the other party.”71 It also
states that when this is not possible, “the contract will require that such
proprietary information of the other party be held in conﬁdence.”72 In the
case of Big Tech, most data will probably fall into the latter category because
it will be diﬃcult to render data completely inaccessible to one party in the
breakup without curtailing its basic functions. For example, Google AdSense
relies on the Google Search algorithm and its resulting consumer data, since
its entire business model is targeted advertising to speciﬁc audiences.73 The
same applies to Amazon’s Marketplace and private-label goods.74 Thus,
breaking up Big Tech companies with interdependent data would result in
companies simply holding the other party’s information “in conﬁdence” from
outside companies or the public, but still possessing it to potentially use
internally. This is not a suﬃcient solution to the antitrust problems that that
breakup intends to solve, as these companies can still use that proprietary
data to the detriment of third parties that do not possess it.
As a result of this deep integration within technology corporations, a
section of the company that may have been otherwise well-suited for a spinoﬀ
may simply have to be dissolved instead if its business model cannot survive
without the proprietary data. Even if we can keep proprietary data together
as one singular asset, this may not cure the antitrust issues that the breakup
Supra notes 6–7, 22 and accompanying text.
Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 108.
Id. at 108-09.
See If Google is Free How Does It Make So Much Money?, supra note 31 (describing how Google
makes money through targeted advertising). Some social media platforms and other big tech
companies have been intentionally designed to make themselves hard to separate. For an explanation
of how Facebook has integrated functionalities and data with Instagram to avoid being broken up
by regulators, see Aaron Mak, How Facebook Tried to Make Itself Antitrust-Proof, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2020,
6:22 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/12/facebook-antitrust-ftc-breakup-whatsapp-instagramzuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/52CQ-ZC26].
74 See supra Section I.A.4.
70
71
72
73
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intended to solve. This is because network eﬀects will make the data more
valuable as a whole, and whichever entity gets to keep this block of data going
forward may not have its business aﬀected in any substantial way. The
breakup would therefore have very little pro-competitive beneﬁts, and its
only real result would be dissolving periphery aspects of the business that
were not the main threat in the market to begin with. The resulting eﬀect on
consumer welfare will be “unambiguously negative” if the resulting ﬁrms are
unable to survive the divestment.75 This is easy to see in the Big Tech context
as well; if Google Search fails or must start charging users because its zeroprice model was being subsidized by its other business, consumers would be
harmed by the breakup.
Even if the business was structured in a way where the data could easily
be split up between the two companies, this would only remedy the antitrust
violation if the resulting standalone companies would actually operate as
competitors. Antitrust scholar Hebert Hovenkamp explained this concept
through the following example:
“[B]reaking apart noncompeting units does not necessarily increase the
amount of competition. If a manufacturer makes 80% of the world’s toasters
and 75% of the world’s blenders, compelling divestiture of one will yield one
ﬁrm that makes 80% of the world’s toasters and a second ﬁrm that makes 75%
of the world’s blenders. Because the two divisions are not competitors to
begin with, we have done nothing to increase the amount of competition.”76

Therefore, if the new companies are going to have the dominant market share
in each of their products or services, nothing has been done to cure the
anticompetitive nature of their respective markets, and the breakup has not
furthered any substantial antitrust goals.
b. Intellectual Property and Licensing
Another central feature of tech companies is that intellectual property
rights are often at the heart of their businesses. Design patents, patented
algorithms, and trademarks are all examples of Big Tech’s abundant usage of
patents.77 Some have even argued that patents are the reason that antitrust

75 Phillips, supra note 49, at 18. See also id. at n.62 (“Along with reestablishing the acquired ﬁrm,
it is also necessary that this ‘new’ ﬁrm be made viable; a mere shadow of its former self is not
acceptable. Indeed, reestablishing ‘new’ ﬁrms that are unable to stand on their own would make any
relief eﬀorts farcical.” (internal quotes omitted) (citing Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law:
Pyrrhic Victories, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 45 (1969)).
76 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 2010 (2021).
77 See Rosellen Downey, Top of the List: Apple, Google, Facebook Get Most Patents Approved in
Silicon Valley, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (July 27, 2020, 9:26 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
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remedies often fall short in regulating technology companies, since patents
in a way grant legal monopolies.78
The AT&T Consent Decree recognized that patents can be essential to
the business operations of both companies in a breakup and granted the
regional companies “nonexclusive and personal royalty-free licenses to
use . . . equipment and operational methods covered by existing United
States patents owned or controlled by AT&T.”79 Dividing up patents poses
less of an issue than proprietary information because patents would relate to
the mechanics of obtaining data, not the data itself.80 Likewise, copyrights
were given similar treatment under the AT&T Consent Decree, and the
regional companies were “granted rights under copyrights owned by AT&T.”81
This approach is straightforward and allows each standalone company to
utilize essential patents and copyrights, which is theoretically a feasible
strategy to implement in a tech company breakup. The ability to share
intellectual property royalty-free is especially important because tech
companies often integrate their acquisitions quickly—for example, when
Facebook bought Instagram it enabled the acquiree to utilize Facebook’s
photo tagging feature and allowed cross-posting between the social networks,
both of which are now essential features of the platform.82 One concern is
that this method of splitting up intellectual property relies heavily on
licensing, which means that the companies will have contractual ties after the
breakup. The monitoring and regulation of these post-divestiture interactions
will be crucial to the success of the breakup and the furtherance of any
antitrust goals.83 A potentially more eﬀective remedy for the problem would
be to focus on placing restrictions around intellectual property-based
acquisitions prior to their integration, rather than focusing on structural
remedies after the fact. For example, limiting acquisitions of intellectual
property to nonexclusive licenses or requiring that dominant ﬁrms license
sanjose/news/2020/07/27/top-of-the-list-patent-recipients.html [https://perma.cc/G298-62AU] (describing
the eﬀorts of Big Tech lawyers to secure numerous patents).
78 See, e.g., Paul Morinville, Antitrust Laws Are Not Enough to Kill Big Tech Monopolies, IP
WATCHDOG (July 16, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/16/antitrust-laws-not-enoughkill-big-tech-monopolies/id=111316 [https://perma.cc/2EYD-TP8F].
79 Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 411.
80 Here, the term “patents” is used primarily to describe utility patents. Design patents should
be divided up with the same considerations as trademarks and trade names, which are discussed later
in this section.
81 Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 415.
82 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Regulators Want to Break Up Facebook. That’s a Technical Nightmare,
Insiders Say., WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2020, 2:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/12/11/facebook-breakup-antitrust [https://perma.cc/4KQQ-7HQZ] (“Instagram’s growth was
supercharged by its integration with Facebook, which happened almost immediately after Facebook
bought the company for $1 billion in 2012.”).
83 An in-depth exploration of post-divestiture mechanics will be addressed later in this section.
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certain technology on reasonable terms could help share the market growth
associated with that technology with other ﬁrms in the sector.84
Finally, the Consent Decree also devotes a signiﬁcant portion to
discussing trademarks and trade names. It strictly states that AT&T and the
regional operating companies were no longer permitted to use any common
corporate name after the breakup.85 It argues that this is because the essence
of trademark protection requires that a trademark’s owner “control the quality
of the product or service associated with it,” which is incompatible with the
breakup’s requirement that the regional companies perform functions
completely independent of AT&T after the separation.86 The prohibition
against using a common corporate name would work in the case of a company
like Facebook divesting Instagram or WhatsApp. But when breaking apart
companies currently using common names, such as divesting Amazon Basics
from Amazon Marketplace, this requirement would be more problematic.
Also, in the event that a breakup requires splitting up one solid entity
rather than unwinding a merger, the post-breakup entity that gets to keep the
trademarked name will have a competitive advantage over the other
companies.87 An example of this restructuring would be breaking up Google
Search into three smaller search engine companies. Even ten years ago,
Google’s trademark was estimated to be valued at forty-four billion dollars,
which accounted for 27% of the ﬁrm’s overall value at that time.88 So, in a case
such as this one, the company awarded the trademarked name in the breakup
would be granted an enormous asset, and may even be able to retain close to
the same market share the parent company had prior to the breakup. In such
a disproportionate situation, retiring the trademark altogether may be the
only acceptable option.
3. Post-Divestiture Interactions
Administrators have previously considered structural antitrust remedies
to be one-time enforcement actions, whereas behavioral remedies “require
ongoing government oversight of the monopolist.”89 But, it will be important
84 See Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 2043-44 (discussing in depth the remedy of using
nonexclusive licenses to address intellectual property concerns in antitrust).
85 Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 416.
86 Id. at 415.
87 See Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational
Beliefs”, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 618 n.67 (2007) (describing how trademark protection aids
businesses in protecting their strategic advantage).
88 Sean Stoneﬁeld, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011, 11:22 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanstoneﬁeld/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks
[https://perma.cc/5CQ8-VSDA].
89 Van Loo, supra note 6, at 1958.
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for the court to dictate the speciﬁc details surrounding the interactions
between the divested companies, since they will necessarily be in contact
frequently. This post-divestiture monitoring is essential when crafting an
eﬀective breakup.
a. Contracts
A recurring element throughout AT&T’s breakup proposal is the reliance
of post-divestiture contracts between AT&T and the BOCs that will be used
to regulate the business relationships between the newly separated entities.
The use of post-divestiture contracts is likely an essential ingredient of a
successful breakup of the companies, as some level of interaction between the
new entities is inevitable for at least an initial period, and these interactions
are best addressed through predetermined contractual provisions. Waiting
until after the breakup is approved to iron out the details of these contracts
would be inadvisable since the speciﬁcs would be determined without any
oversight from the court or regulatory agency. Therefore, while these postdivestiture contracts are an important takeaway from the AT&T breakup
proposal, it is essential that any Big Tech breakup proposal consider certain
details and dictate speciﬁc provisions within those contracts. Since these
contracts would have to be implemented immediately post-breakup, it is
essential that the court scrutinize not only the breakup proposal as a whole
for antitrust issues, but also consider whether or not any future contracts
included between the parties are absolutely necessary and akin to contracts
issued to outside competitors.90
The AT&T court failed to consider the competitive impact of the
contracts. For instance, one provision that was approved by the court
stipulates that:
[t]he non-owning party [of a multifunction facility] will have the right to
require changes in multifunction facilities (other than increases in capacity)
which will not impair the use of that facility by the owning party, provided
that the costs of any such changes will be borne by the non-owner, unless the
parties otherwise agree . . . .91

Here, the divestiture had not even occurred and already the court has
approved a provision that could enable a spinoﬀ company to obtain a
90 For example, the AT&T Consent Decree allows for contracts between the parties to
contain an indemnity provision. Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 68. The court must inquire
whether this kind of indemnity provision is common in AT&T’s contracts with outside
competitors and, if parallel contracts do not exist, whether such a provision is in pursuit of the
breakup’s procompetitive goals.
91 Id. at 63.
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favorable contract provision from its former parent company. The court
approved this provision even though such favorable contract terms may never
have been oﬀered by the company to an outside competitor that was
attempting to do business with that company under ordinary market
conditions. Such a provision—or any other provision that similarly gives any
kind of contractual beneﬁt that a competitor would otherwise not receive—
should be avoided completely.
Some may argue that forcing these contract terms to adhere so closely to
standard contracts with competitors will cause unnecessary stress on the
parties during the breakup period. However, the Supreme Court already
determined that “the Government cannot be denied the [divestiture] remedy
because economic hardship, however severe, may result.”92 Per the doctrine,
ﬁnancial or other hardship is not a valid consideration when drafting the
structure of a breakup, and it is important to remember that a breakup is a
legal remedy for antitrust violations committed by the company. If the terms
issued during the breakup cause excessive hardship on the divested
corporations to the point where they may fail and cause consumer harm, it is
likely a sign that a breakup is not the correct remedy93—not that the terms of
the breakup need to be made more favorable. Therefore, the level of rigor
when scrutinizing whether contract provisions resemble the ones given to
outside competitors should not be lessened due to ﬁnancial considerations,
especially when they appear in contracts that are not intended or scheduled
to expire by a certain date post-breakup.
Indeed, the expiration of these contracts is an important aspect to
consider thoroughly. In the AT&T Consent Decree, it is stated that “AT&T
and the BOCs intend to cease sharing network facilities as promptly as is
reasonably feasible.”94 At ﬁrst glance, this seems like a key provision in
promoting competition after the breakup and thoroughly separating the
companies’ business interests. However, applying this kind of provision to
Big Tech companies may prove diﬃcult and presents its own unique set of
challenges.95 It is important to consider whether these kinds of provisions are
feasible when the contracts relate to sharing an intangible item such as
consumer data or intellectual property like a proprietary algorithm, as
92 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 327 (1961). But see Van Loo,
supra note 6, at 1990 (describing how the court of appeals overturned Microsoft’s breakup order
because it believed testimony about shareholder value should have been considered).
93 See infra Section II.C.
94 Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 56.
95 In the case of physical assets or easily divisible or easily recreated intangible assets, an
expiration provision is still advisable, because it balances the fact that certain post-breakup contracts
are a practical necessity while also acknowledging that sharing facilities for too long could pose
antitrust problems that negate the breakup’s desired procompetitive goals. Any platform breakup
proposal should still utilize these types of expiration provisions where possible.
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opposed to the physical assets they were used for in the AT&T Consent
Decree. As discussed previously in this Comment, intangible assets like data
and intellectual property create an additional set of concerns to consider when
formulating a breakup proposal.96 Since some of these intangibles may be so
central to the business model of the company as well as proprietary and
therefore diﬃcult to recreate or separate, there may not be a way for the
companies to exist without having contracts in perpetuity. One may argue
that certain agreements for intangible assets, like those for sharing intellectual
property, are akin to a standard licensing agreement and therefore do not
need an expiration date to avoid antitrust issues. However, since the
agreements will need to be drafted while the companies are still together and
may involve data or algorithms that would never have ordinarily been shared
with a competitor, it could be easy for the divesting company to slip in
sweetheart provisions that aﬀord it a favorable position in the market and
therefore frustrate the procompetitive goals of the breakup. Furthermore, the
fact that there will now be two competing companies in possession of an
intangible asset that previously belonged to a single company is not enough
to promote competition. Recall the example of Google advertising and
Google Search discussed in Subsection II.A.2. In a case like this where the
separated companies both rely on the same algorithm but will compete in
diﬀerent markets after the separation, there is little antitrust beneﬁt in the
resulting market, since even though Google will be made into two smaller
ﬁrms, the resulting ﬁrms will still have the same dominant position in the
market that they held prior to the breakup.97 As a result, additional
consideration will be needed when dealing with contracts related to sharing
intangible assets. Again, if the divested corporations are unable to exist as
wholly separate entities and require having certain contracts that will tie them
together indefinitely, it may be another sign that a breakup is not the correct
remedy for that case.
b. Dispute Resolution
In addition to ongoing contracts and post-divestiture interactions
between the companies, there will inevitably be a need to review these
interactions. The AT&T Consent Decree proactively addresses this need by
establishing an Intercompany Review Board that would act as a standing
committee for immediate dispute resolution for minor disputes arising out of
Infra Subsection II.B.2.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 2006 (“An antitrust remedy should be evaluated by its
success in increasing output, decreasing prices, improving product quality, or spurring
innovation . . . . It is not antitrust’s purpose to make ﬁrms smaller, unproﬁtable, or less
eﬃcient . . . .”).
96
97
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the agreement.98 The Intercompany Review Board is comprised of executives
from each company and is primarily for resolving business disputes that might
arise from the ongoing contracts rather than serving any antitrust function.99
While the use of an Intercompany Review Board to solve post-divestiture
disputes between the companies has beneﬁts, it also raises some concerns. As
mentioned previously, it is crucial that any post-divestiture contracts between
the companies that will be used for a signiﬁcant amount of time are as close
as possible to contracts issued to outside competitors.100 On one hand, the use
of a review board such as this could be helpful in resolving minor
disagreements that require immediate resolution, as the decree intends it
to.101 This is helpful because the companies will have contact after the breakup
as a matter of necessity, and there will be an inevitable transition period before
they can act as fully autonomous companies. A review board is well-suited to
serve its function during this interim period. However, the AT&T Consent
Decree makes no mention of an end date for this Board yet simultaneously allows
for informal resolution of disputes related to the restructuring,102 a combination
that could be dangerously anticompetitive without any oversight.
Additionally, the AT&T Consent Decree’s dispute resolution process
allows for disputes not solved by the Board within ten days to be submitted
for binding arbitration.103 Arbitration contracts are popular contract
provisions and likely could be found in contracts with outside competitors as
well.104 However, since these contracts were a result of an antitrust remedy,
it is advisable that true legal disputes arising out of these contracts face full
legal scrutiny in court, as arbitration is often favorable to corporate interests
and could result in lower settlement amounts or other beneﬁts that a court
would not have otherwise approved.105 Further, the removal of any arbitration
Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 72-73.
See id. at 72 (“[A]ny dispute . . . arising out of the provisions of this Agreement, or any
dispute regarding interpretation of any of its provisions, or any other dispute . . . will be referred
within two working days to the Intercompany Review Board.”).
100 See supra Subsection II.A.3.a.
101 See Consent Decree, supra note 54, at 72 (“Because many of the disagreements . . . will be
minor in nature but will require immediate resolution, the contracts will provide [procedures for
dispute resolution, including the Intercompany Review Board].”).
102 Id. at 73.
103 Id.
104 Cf. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-tothe-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers [https://perma.cc/JFB7-Z8KQ]
(reporting on the widespread use of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts).
105 See Ross Eisenbrey, Mandatory Arbitration Unfairly Tilts the Legal System in Favor of
Corporations and Employers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.epi.org/
publication/mandatory-arbitration-unfairly-tilts-the-legal-system [https://perma.cc/63CD-NCJH]
(“Private arbitration can forbid class actions, limit damages, allow the employer to choose the
arbitrator, and cut oﬀ appeals, resulting in a system unfairly tilted in the employer’s favor.”).
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clause would allow the court to monitor and potentially rework some of the
provisions added to ensure that the court’s procompetitive goals were being
met, something even an unbiased arbitration court would be ill-suited to do.
A well-crafted Big Tech breakup proposal should include some variation
of an Intercompany Review Board to smooth things over during the
transition period, but it is advisable that such a Board include either thirdparty persons who can act as a guidepost for industry standards or regulators
who can conﬁrm that none of the resolutions are leading to anticompetitive
beneﬁts. Since such a board has many beneﬁts during the immediate postdivestiture period, the court might as well take advantage of the board’s
existence by using it for ongoing antitrust oversight.
B. Are Breakups the Answer?
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that orchestrating the breakup of a
Big Tech company would be extremely complex and much more challenging
than the AT&T breakup was. This does not mean that courts should not
pursue breakups as a remedy just because it would be complicated, it only
means that care should be taken to make sure that a breakup is the best
solution for eﬃciently remedying antitrust violations.
Some scholars have posited that breakups are most useful when reversing
acquisitions and spinning oﬀ previously acquired companies that would be
competitive in the market.106 This is supported by the analysis above, which
demonstrates how diﬃcult it is when one intangible resource is central to the
business model. However, the degree of integration of an acquired company
will also factor into whether it is a good candidate for a spinoﬀ at all.107 For
example, in the case of Facebook, Instagram was so immediately and heavily
integrated that it would likely take years for a breakup to be ﬁnalized.108 A
former Facebook engineer stated that “Instagram is no longer viable outside
of Facebook infrastructure. They spent six years moving things over.”109
Again, the fact that a breakup would be cumbersome and lengthy is not alone
a reason not to utilize a structural remedy, but time comes with a cost. A
multi-year breakup would mean a lot of time for anticompetitive harms to
take place, and a lot of time for companies to ﬁnd clever ways to retain their
competitive advantage. Also, in an industry like technology that changes so
106 See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 76 (discussing breakups and spinoﬀs as one of the
possible remedies for technology platform monopolies).
107 See id. at 2008 (“In some cases, acquired assets are eventually so completely integrated into
the acquiring ﬁrm that the spinoﬀ problem is not materially diﬀerent from that of internally
developed assets.”).
108 See Dwoskin, supra note 82 (stating the opinion of a former Facebook engineer who
supports a breakup but admits that “[i]t would take years”).
109 Id.
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rapidly, the spinoﬀ company—or the entire market for that matter—could be
obsolete by the time the breakup is complete, and the Big Tech parent
company’s business model could look completely diﬀerent. On the other
hand, a less integrated and more recently acquired asset like WhatsApp
“would be more like a six-month technical project.”110 However, even though
WhatsApp is less integrated, another source argued that spinning it oﬀ while
maintaining the quality of service would actually “take years.”111 If courts
believe this would be a beneﬁcial spinoﬀ, there are few compelling reasons,
in addition to the lengthy timelines discussed, not to advocate for a breakup
in this instance.112 For example, some have speculated that “[t]he practice of
retroactively unwinding mergers will spark caution and uncertainty among
businesses and presumably dim merger activity,” which is another factor that
may aﬀect the competitiveness of the market and should be considered.113
For divestitures that don’t involve unwinding mergers but rather require
dividing up an entity that has always functioned as one company, the analysis
in Part II.A shows the extraordinary diﬃculty this will present. Even in
historical antitrust cases where the divestiture involved a manufacturing
company—which, based on the prior analysis in this Comment, would be the
simplest kind of business to separate as it does not involve many intangible
assets—dividing up integrated physical assets was deemed too diﬃcult to
separate according to the court.114 The judge in that case stated that “with one
set of jigs and tools, one foundry, one laboratory for machinery problems, one
managerial staﬀ, and one labor force[,] [i]t takes no Solomon to see that this
organism cannot be cut into three equal and viable parts.”115 In cases where
one business is split up into smaller competitive companies, it will be diﬃcult
to ensure that the resulting companies are all functional, and “[t]he goal is to
maintain the competition that the merger would have eliminated, which
requires that the divested assets remain in the market at their current
competitive strength for the foreseeable future.”116
Finally, the remedy of breaking up a company also involves heavy costs to
the eﬃciency of that company, which in turn can lead to an increase in prices
or decrease in quantity, which is antithetical to the goals of antitrust under

Id.
Id.
See id. (describing how a breakup would be inadvisable because of the way Facebook
“integrated the back-end technology” to deeply intwine the functionalities of Facebook and Instagram).
113 Susie Kim, The Warren Proposal to Break Up Big Tech, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/202
[https://perma.cc/ZP4F-E649].
114 Phillips, supra note 49, at 17-18.
115 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953).
116 Phillips, supra note 49, at 18.
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the consumer welfare standard.117 When suggesting a structural remedy, it is
important to keep in mind the beneﬁts aﬀorded by economies of scale and
economies of scope. It is better to promote remedies that address antitrust
violations while still preserving the benefits of economies of scale and scope.118
C. Alternate Remedies
Since breakups will be a challenging remedy to implement regardless of
whether it is a spinoﬀ unwinding a merger or a divestiture breaking up one
business into competitive parts, it is best to explore alternative remedies that may
provide the same procompetitive benefits as a breakup without the challenges.
For example, recent scholarship has highlighted the possibility of
expanding the use of the essential facilities doctrine,119 which seems to be
especially beneﬁcial when monopolists possess intangible essential facilities,
as is frequently the case in the technology industry.120 Additionally, if a
structural remedy is still preferable to a behavioral one, structural separation
could be a viable solution to cure anticompetitive harms by prohibiting
businesses from entering certain industries while not necessarily requiring
that they be broken up.121 In addition, mandating interoperability could
increase competition while still preserving economies of scale and scope.122
Finally, the best remedy in a larger sense would be to increase enforcement
of currently available antitrust regulations. For example, heavily increasing
the scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions at an earlier stage would save
agencies from having to go through lengthy lawsuits to undo them once they
prove anticompetitive.
Although all these alternate remedies present their own difficulties, they avoid
the high risk that breaking up companies would make the resulting businesses too
inefficient to compete, therefore harming consumers and doing little to improve
117 See Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 2020 (“[B]reakups may impair eﬃcient operation and
harm consumers in the process.”).
118 See id. at 2032-33 (discussing the beneﬁts of remedies such as interoperability which can
address competitive concerns while still allowing for economies of scale and scope).
119 The essential facilities doctrine requires an entity with control of an essential asset or
infrastructure to allow competitors to access that resource. The doctrine is not commonly invoked
by the courts, and the standard for being an essential facility is high. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.,
Unilateral, Unconditional Refusals to Deal with Rivals, in COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLEFIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 119, 127-29 (2008).
120 Sandheep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A New Way Forward for the Essential Facilities
Doctrine, 3 UTAH L. REV. 911, 913 (2010) (“Prudent application of the doctrine to intangible essential
facilities . . . can improve market outcomes.”).
121 See Khan, supra note 9, at 980 (suggesting prohibitions on market entry as one means of
increasing the viability of structural separations).
122 See Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 1992 (“[A] high degree of interoperability . . . facilitates
competition inside the network.”).
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competition in the market. Furthermore, these alternate solutions are all wellsuited to the technology sector and are thus more likely to be successful.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the technology industry and the dominance of a small
concentration of Big Tech ﬁrms in that sector has led to increased antitrust
scrutiny by regulators, politicians, and the general public. Demands to break
up the Big Tech companies and restore competition in the market have been
heard frequently but often with little speciﬁcity as to how this will be
accomplished and a lack of consideration for the unique business practices
utilized in the technology sector. Structural remedies like breakups have been
used infrequently in the history of United States antitrust regulation, but
previous blueprints for breakups—especially the AT&T breakup of 1984
which was widely considered to be a success—can act as a starting point for
drafting a Big Tech breakup proposal.
When looking in depth at the mechanics of separating companies, we
must consider three major categories: physical assets, intangible assets, and
post-divestiture monitoring. First, physical assets are the most
straightforward to split up. On the other hand, intangible assets will be much
more diﬃcult to divide, which is problematic. Proprietary algorithms and
large amounts of consumer data are central aspects of the business model of
a technology company, because many ﬁrms use data collected by one prong
of their business to aid another prong. This interdependence among diﬀerent
subsidiaries will make it diﬃcult for the businesses to stand alone if separated,
or alternatively cause them to start charging consumers for services rather
than focusing on data collection. Additionally, assigning the trademark to one
of the companies after a divestiture will severely disadvantage the others to
the point where they may not remain viable. Finally, post-divestiture
interactions will be frequent and inevitable, so courts will have to carefully
draft these specific provisions before the divestiture is approved to avoid issues
of self-dealing or sweetheart deals among the firms after they are split up.
Administering a breakup would be diﬃcult regardless of whether it was a
spinoﬀ or a divestiture, so it is advisable to look toward other remedies that
do not pose as much risk to consumers. Propositions tailored to the
technology industry like the expansion of the essential facilities doctrine,
structural separation by prohibiting business in certain markets, and increased
scrutiny during the merger approval process are all suitable alternatives to
breakups that may be even more eﬃcient in restoring competition. The
ultimate goal is to bring procompetitive beneﬁts to the technology sector’s
markets, so rather than using the remedy that feels the most punitive, it is
better to ﬁnd the remedy that is most beneﬁcial.

